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Mingjiang Li. Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet Split: Ideological dilemma.
New York: Routledge, 2012.
The Sino-Soviet split was a momentous development in Cold War history. It undermined
the international communist movement, constituted a dramatic shift in the global balance of
power in Washington’s favor, and was a major factor in the eventual demise of the Soviet Union
and the disintegration of the Communist bloc. Why did the “brotherly solidarity” between the
Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), once viewed by Moscow and Beijing as
“eternal” and “unbreakable,” unravel in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s and escalate to the point
of bloody military clashes along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969? Since the end of the Cold War,
scholars have utilized newly available primary sources from the former Communist world to
shed more light on this question, but they have reached dissimilar conclusions.1 Mingjiang Li, an
associate professor of political science at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, is the
latest scholar to address this question while also contributing more broadly to the study of China
and the Cold War, foreign policy and politics in Mao’s China, and the role of ideology in
international politics.
Using recently declassified documents from the Foreign Ministry archives of the PRC, Li
contends that ideology, driven primarily by China’s domestic politics, is crucial to understanding
the origins and evolution of the Sino-Soviet rupture. His interpretation is at odds with those of
scholars who place greater emphasis on other factors such as competing national security
interests, struggles for leadership of the international communist movement, economic disputes,
cultural differences, or personality clashes. Although Li’s monograph complements a recent
spate of scholarship that foregrounds ideology as the central factor in explaining the breakdown
in Sino-Soviet relations, he contends that existing scholarship has theoretical shortcomings
because it fails to adequately account for the ebbs and flows in ideological friction between
Moscow and Beijing. In order to explicate this fluctuating effect of ideology, Li introduces the
concept of an “ideological dilemma” and theorizes it in an attempt to better explain the dynamics
of the Sino-Soviet split and further our understanding of the relationship between ideology and
foreign policy.
Following an introductory chapter that critically reviews the literature on the Sino-Soviet
split, chapter two explains the concept of an ideological dilemma and why it is an effective
framework for understanding the variability of ideological influence on foreign policy.
Ideological dilemmas arise when ideological differences between states challenge or threaten the
legitimacy of their leaders’ political power and domestic policy programs. Attempts by leaders in
one state to defend their ideological position to domestic audiences elicits criticism and
comparable disapproval from leaders of rival states, essentially generating a vicious cycle of
antagonism that has the potential to trigger interstate security disputes. In saying this, the author
argues that the impact of the ideological dilemma on a state’s foreign policy is not static; rather,
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it waxes and wanes in accordance with domestic and international circumstances. The relative
strength of this concept is that it presents a more flexible and nuanced method of understanding
the relationship between ideology and foreign policy in comparison to other approaches to
international relations, which view ideology as either a constant and critical factor influencing
foreign policy (social constructivism) or as absent and irrelevant (realism/neorealism).
Li next applies the concept of an ideological dilemma to examine the unfolding of the
Sino-Soviet split from the late 1950’s through the first phase (1966-1969) of the Cultural
Revolution and divides his analysis into six chapters, each corresponding to what he considers
six critical phases in the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Traditional accounts of the SinoSoviet split maintain that it began in February 1956 when Khrushchev criticized Stalin and
advocated a policy of peaceful coexistence with the West at the Twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.2 However, Li presents evidence to show that the Chinese
leadership’s reactions to this development were less negative than traditionally understood.
While his suggestion that Sino-Soviet cooperation in 1956 and 1957 “marked the peak of the
alliance” (p. 21) is debatable, his sources convincingly demonstrate that the reorientation of
Soviet ideology and policy and its attendant friction in Sino-Soviet relations insufficiently
accounts for the breakdown in the alliance.
Not until Mao’s launching of the Great Leap Forward, Li contends, did indications of the
Sino-Soviet split emerge. His central argument is that Mao purposefully escalated ideological
disputes with Moscow in order to advance his domestic programs and defeat political
challengers. Opposition to the Great Leap Forward program from both Moscow and domestic
rivals in China—in addition to the program’s ultimate failure—impelled Mao to exacerbate
ideological tensions, which invited counter actions from the Soviet Union. This vicious cycle of
the ideological dilemma repeated itself at various moments throughout the 1960’s and intensified
to such a degree during the Cultural Revolution that it spilled over into the national security
arena, most notably during the Sino-Soviet border skirmishes in March 1969.
A major strength of Li’s book lies in its interdisciplinary approach, which combines
history and political science to analyze the origins and dynamics of the Sino-Soviet split. For
example, his historical research shows that Sino-Soviet relations improved for brief periods in
the wake of the catastrophic Great Leap Forward and after Khrushchev was removed from power
in October 1964. This thaw in relations coincided with periods when the ideological influence on
Beijing’s foreign policy was less pronounced. His concept of an ideological dilemma, which
contributes to the field of international relations, is able to account for both this diminishing
ideological friction and its subsequent intensification. Although the concept of an ideological
dilemma furthers our understanding of the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy and the SinoSoviet split, its utility in terms of comprehending other case studies or other states’ foreign
policy is an area for future research.
Another strength of Mao’s China and the Sino-Soviet split is its use of newly declassified
Chinese documents, which furthers our understanding of China’s domestic politics and foreign
policy towards the Soviet Union. However, the work’s exclusive reliance on Chinese primary
sources also constitutes its major weakness. Li correctly points out that Mao was primarily
responsible for destabilizing the alliance between Moscow and Beijing, but multi-national
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archival research is necessary for a more complete picture of the origins and evolution of the
Sino-Soviet split. Additionally, Li’s work is constrained by the fact that these documents
represent only a partial declassification of the Foreign Ministry materials, and the most important
ones, located at the Chinese Communist Party Central Archive, are inaccessible to the public.
Overall, Li builds on the work of other scholars who argue that the centrality of ideology,
fueled by Mao’s need to mobilize the Chinese populace for domestic purposes, is the main factor
behind Chinese foreign policy-making and the breakdown in the Sino-Soviet relations.3
However, his theorizing the concept of an ideological dilemma to explain the Sino-Soviet split is
novel and provides a more nuanced understanding of the ebbs and flows in ideological friction
between the Soviet Union and the PRC. Li’s book essentially contributes to a growing body of
literature that seeks to understand Sino-Soviet relations and China’s role in the global Cold War;
nonetheless, scholarly debate over the driving force behind the Sino-Soviet split and China’s
foreign policy is likely to continue so long as important Chinese documents remain off limits.
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Georgetown University
bm323@georgetown.edu

3

Chen, Mao’s China and the Cold War and Lüthi, The Sino-Soviet Split.

